Drawing on an agency theoretic framework, this paper examines the relative performance of eight categories of investment trusts from the period 1994-99. Unlike earlier work, two benchmarks are employed, the average annual performance of a given fund category and a relevant market index. It also tests for the relationship between fees and performance, and looks for evidence of fund specific behaviour. The results are not unambiguous. Some evidence points to fund level persistence in performance, boldness in risk taking, and a negative effect on variance from previous performance. Fund specific behaviour was also found. Using a variety of definitions for fees, virtually no relationship with performance could be established. (109 words) Keywords: relative performance of UK investment trusts, agency theoretic approach, persistence, and egregiousness, inter-fund differences.
Introduction
An investment trust is one of five types of managed fund offered in the UK, which allow investors to diversify their investment and benefit from the superior knowledge of the market the fund managers are supposed to have. Unit trusts (open ended mutual funds), life offices, investment bonds and offshore funds are other forms of collective investment.
Investment trusts are structured as limited public companies with a fixed share of capital at any time, and as such, are a type of closed-end fund. Their US equivalent is the closed-end mutual trust. With reference to the UK, they are the oldest of managed funds, dating back to 1868. Unlike unit trusts, investment bonds, etc., investment trusts can raise capital not only through ordinary shares, but a wide variety of other types of shares, such as preference shares. Most closed-end funds engage in very little borrowing, and rarely come close to the regulatory limit. At least 85% of dividends must be distributed. Unlike the US, capital gains cannot be distributed and are reinvested, but they have been exempt from capital gains tax since March 1980. In 1998, the market capitalisation of UK closed-end funds was about one-quarter of open-end funds (Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999 ).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relative performance of 288 investment trusts over the period 1994-99. Using the annual rate of return, relative performance strategy is assessed using two benchmarks, the average performance of a fund category as a whole and a relevant market index. Also, inter-fund differences within a given fund category are tested, and the relationship between fees and performance is examined. Section 2 reviews related literature. The conceptual background to the study is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the data and the hypotheses to be tested and the fifth section summarises the main findings. Section 6 concludes.
Related Research
Most of the literature on managed funds comes from the US, with some UK studies, including a small number on UK investment trusts. Given the Dimson and MinioKozerski's recent (1999) comprehensive survey on closed-end funds, this section will concentrate on relating the approach taken here to previous work, especially studies using UK data 1 . 1 There is a large body of research on closed-end funds which attempt to explain an interesting anomaly observed in both the US and UK -the price movement of shares in
The earlier literature considers the performance of managed funds in comparison to both a risk free and market rate of return. For example, Sharpe (1966 ), Treynor (1965 and Lintner (1965) use a capital asset pricing model approach to rank funds.
The standard estimating equation is: R pt -R ft = β p (R mt -R ft ) + ε pt , where:
R pt : the mean portfolio return; R mt : the market return and R ft : the risk-free rate of return, all continuously compounded. β p : systematic risk Jansen (1968) tests for the statistical significance of excess returns:
where α p is Jansen's differential performance measure for fund p, which indicates the manager's ability (or lack of it) to select a fund that outperforms the risk free rate of return. If CAPM holds, then α p should be zero because in an efficient market, no fund would earn an excess return. If α p >0, the portfolio has made excess returns; if negative, then it has performed worse than a randomly selected portfolio. Bal and Leger (1996) apply the above formula to 92 UK investment trusts using 14, 5 year roll over time periods from 1975 to 1993. They find that on average, funds do not outperform the market, with the exception of some individual funds. Black, Fraser and Power (1992) introduce the possibility of time varying systematic risk employing a Kalman filter and maximum likelihood techniques. The dataset consists of monthly observations of 30 UK unit trusts from January 1980 to December 1989. Like Bal and Leger, they employ the Financial Times All share index as a proxy for market returns. One-third of the unit trusts were found to outperform the market. The results contrast with Ward and Saunders (1976) , where none of the unit trusts outperformed the market, and about 25% of the sample underperformed. Moles (1981) reported similar findings. Black et al. suggest that allowing for time variance in β explains why their own results differ from those of other studies. Blake and Timmermann (1998) , using monthly returns (calculated using bid prices and net income) on 1402 surviving and 973 dead unit trusts over the period , report that on average, UK equity funds under-perform by about 1.8% per closed-end funds, which include investment trusts. Closed-end IPOs are issued at a premium but quite quickly, begin to be traded at a discount to the underlying net asset value of the fund. See, among others Minio-Kozerski (1998, 1999) , and Gemmill and Thomas (2000) . The present article's key objectives preclude analysis of this issue.
annum on a risk adjusted basis. They find some evidence of persistence: a portfolio of the best performing quartile of unit trusts perform better in the next period than one with the quartile of worst-performers. Thus past performance is some guide to future performance. They also report an estimate of survivor bias, a point to be discussed later in the paper.
Kevin James (1999) computes the actual cost of investing in UK retail management funds. James' sample consists of UK equity unit trusts, using annual returns on the market, the average return on funds, and average charges over a 10 year period from 01/98 to 12/99. Similar data are used for life offices. The two types of fund manage just under £800 billion for investors -83% are life offices; 17% are unit trusts. Based on these data, James concludes that on average, to obtain the market return on £1.00, the investor must place £1.55 with the managed fund. James' point is on the notion that investors can do much better on their own, particularly when savings in fees is taken into account. However, James' prime concern is not with the performance of the individual funds, in relation to each other.
The present paper differs from previous work by using two benchmarks to give a more complete picture. It assesses the different funds' performance relative to each other and, like Bal and Leger (1996) , relative to the relevant market index.
Furthermore, this study examines not just the first moment of fund returns but the second moment as well, a feature that previous work has left unexplored. The relationship between fees charged and performance is also tested, employing different definitions of fees. Finally, using a default fund, and employing dummy variables for each investment trust, it is possible to comment on specific fund behaviour within a given category of trusts.
Conceptual Background
The approach adopted here addresses a number of agency theoretic issues in relation to managed funds. There are several reasons for comparing fund performance against the average in a given category. First, fund managers are normally appraised by comparison with peers. Second, consumers wanting (or advised) to acquire a certain type of financial asset are likely to consult league tables, selecting the top performer, or rely on financial press commentary/advertisements emphasising the top performers' relative position. Finally, although switches between funds are small in number, they are likely to be towards the top performer.
Favourable switches or new business imply greater fee income and hence, to some degree, larger rewards for the management team.
performance function for the typical manager, which exhibits areas of bold and cautious behaviour. There are great rewards for ranking at the top of the funds in terms of performance. This creates some overall incentive to gamble (boldness), tempered by the threat of doing badly. Risk taking will appear very attractive both at the very low and fairly high levels of performance, while very high and quite poor performance levels should lead to playing safe. The incentives to conform include the need to avoid future defections if the trust does badly, and to free ride on others'
information. Good relative performance may be due to ability or specialised information, better luck on gambles, or taking more or bigger gambles which paid off.
There are several reasons why outliers in a league table in one year will tend to do better than the rest in the next. First, a standard proposition of portfolio theory (dating back to Hicks, 1935) is that a higher expected return on the portfolio should be possible at the cost of increased variance. Given any persistence in mean return (and the findings suggest there is), this would point to a positive link between variance this year and returns next year.
Second, if the closing weeks of the calendar and bonus year coincide, there should be more gambling because the manager of relatively very poorly performing funds will be concerned about dismissal. There is asymmetry: upside risk raises the prospect of job retention and favourable bonuses but next year, if he/she survives, the manager is unlikely to have to gamble for resurrection and should, on average, to perform better. If the manager is dismissed and replaced, a superior outcome may also be expected, on average. Either way, bad gambles in one year should be followed by a better performance the next.
Third, for funds which have done relatively well, managers will want to play safe the next year. If the trust occupies the top spot one year but drops down the next, it may perform top overall for the two years as a whole. Such a defensive strategy will display a respectable if unspectacular return. In addition, the top performer may be holding a proportionately large set of high return specialised stocks which proved excellent bets and which the rest of the market will now seek to acquire more of in coming quarters. This means there is a chance of realising continual capital gains while the stocks are relatively illiquid.
The practical implications of these observations are scrutinised through tests of a number of hypotheses, outlined in the next section. It has been argued that one would expect to find some evidence of positive persistence in terms of future performance and risk taking. Also, the outliers (good or bad) should show an improvement in the following year, relative to the average. However, figure 1 is simplified because it assumes that the threat of dismissal and winning are the sole factors affecting fund manager utility. Though there will be some modest incremental gains everywhere to the right of the dismissal point, such gains will be dwarfed by the two dominant discontinuities emphasised in the figure. Of course, the fund manager will not know ahead precisely what performance will trigger victory or dismissal. 
The Database and Hypotheses
The data consist of the annual percentage or year on year growth rate for investment trusts with income re-invested over a period of 5 years, 1994 to 1999. In addition there are investment trusts with income withdrawn 2 . Throughout the paper, these two types of trust will be referred to as "income" and "growth" and investment trusts, or IIT and GIT, respectively.
To ensure performance was being compared against a reasonably homogenous group of funds, the trusts were put into categories in terms of geography and type of company. The definition of "ethical" trusts is subjective and for this reason, they were deleted from the sample because there could be no guarantee that this group of funds shared similar characteristics. Funds that reported results for less than 2 of the 5 years were also deleted. The resulting set of sub-samples consist of:
• UK General: 168 UK IITs and GITs. More than 80% of the assets are invested in a broad range of UK registered companies.UK Small: 15 trusts. At least half of the assets are invested in small to medium sized firms registered in the UK.
• Global: 26 funds with investment in assets located around the world, but less than 80% invested in any one geographical area.
• Europe: 35 funds: over 80% of assets are invested in continental Europe.
• US: 11 funds: more than 80% of the assets are invested in US companies.
• Japan: 13 funds: over 80% of the assets are invested in Japanese firms.
• Asia/Pacific:10 funds: over 80% of a given fund consists of investments in firms headquartered in the Far East, but less than 80% of the assets invested in Japanese firms.
• Other Small:10: over half the funds are invested in small firms outside the UK.
Testing nine hypotheses for each of these fund groups provides a detailed picture of performance over the 5 year period. The first four hypotheses are tested using both income and growth investment trusts. For neutrality and simplicity, the hypotheses are expressed in null form:
Hypothesis 1: Past performance is no guide to future performance. The estimating equation is:
where:
F it: rate of growth (including reinvested income) for fund i of group j minus the average rate of growth (including re-invested income) in the year to date t for all fund i's in group j reported in t, where fund i = a given fund, and j= a fund group F ijt-1 is the rate of growth of fund i in group j in the previous year, t-1. For example, F ij99 is the rate of growth for i=Barclays Capital fund in 1999 minus the average rate of growth for all funds reporting in the fund group, j = UK General in 1999. α j : the constant term β j : first order correlation, testing for persistence.
The hypothesis tests whether there is evidence for serial correlation among the trusts. If β = 0, then past performance is no guide to future performance. If β > 0, good past performance relative to the performance of the average fund increases the likelihood of good future performance. If β < 0, evidence points to mean reversion, i.e. good performers in one year likely to be below average performers in the next.
Hypothesis 2: Egregious funds perform the same way as average performing funds,
and past performance has no effect on present performance.
where: γ j : is the coefficient for variance Equation (2) expands (1) to test for the possible effect of variance. It tests whether funds in the tails of the distribution, i.e., those that perform exceptionally well or poorly relative to average performance, tend to perform differently, on average, in the following year. The null hypothesis is that β j =0 and γ j = 0. If γ j >0, exceptionally good/bad funds are likelier than not to register above average performance in the next year; if γ j <0, the opposite is true. fund ijt = % annual growth rate of group fund i in group j at time t index jt = % annual growth rate of index j (e.g. UK General) at time t, where j is the relevant index (e.g. FTSE 350). 
Here, the key question is whether egregious funds (this time compared to the performance of the index) are likelier to register above or below average performance in the next year. The null would imply neither, and also, that there is no serial correlation against the relevant index.
Hypothesis 8: An extension of hypothesis 3. Relevant to index j, variance in relevant performance in year t is independent of variance, or mean relative performance, in the previous years.
The estimating equation is:
This investigation assesses whether egregious funds performance relative to the performance of the appropriate index, registers above or below average performance in the next year, and also, if there is persistence in risk taking.
Hypothesis 9: Inserting firm dummies in equation (5) will show there is no statistically significant individual fund effects.
where: X A ijt : % annual return (income trust) over 12 months to t of fund i from group j y A jt: % increase in stock market index j (most relevant to the fund) in the 12 months to t D i : dummy = 1 for fund i from group j; 0 for all other funds. It is necessary to choose a default fund and remove it from the sample. In each trust category, the default fund removed was the one with an annual growth rate closest to the category's average performance. λi j : the relative performance of fund i, in category j, compared with the default β j : the degree of association of the funds as a group and the stock market, meaning a positive value of β would be expected and as high as unity.
In equation (9) the coefficients on α j and β j should be interpreted together, where α is the constant for the default fund. If β j =1 and α j < 0 (α j >0), then α j measures the percentage annual average under (over) performance of the default fund against the stock market.
Hypothesis 9 is testing, the relative performance of a given fund against the dummy fund. Put another way, how does each fund in a given class vary with the relevant market index (β j ), and can anything be observed in terms of the relative overall performance of every fund in each class, as shown by the significance and sign of the coefficient, λ j ?
With reference to the equations above, the strong-form efficient markets hypothesis would imply β j =0, thus corroborating the null hypothesis for (1) and (6). For equations (2), (3), (7), and (8), it would imply the non-rejection of the null, because trusts would be regarded as, ex-ante, identical. A high, positive β j (close to unity) would be predicted for equations (5) and (9). However, the remarks in section 3 would suggest otherwise; in particular β j would be negative in (3), on balance, and possibly non-zero in (2), (7) and (8). Under the strong form EMH, fees would, presumably, be similar, and if not, higher fees would be linked to higher expected (and actual) performance.
Discussion of the Results
Testing the nine hypotheses involved a large number of OLS regressions. Space constraints prevent the reproduction of the diagnostics of a total of 353 regressions 5 .
Instead, the key findings, notably the coefficients and their significance levels, are reported in the tables below. Given this is a panel, the diagnostics mean very little, except the results on tests for heteroscedasticity. There was very little in the way of heteroscedasticity, and where there is, it is White corrected 6 , making the t-ratio test for significance valid. Table 1 shows the results of estimating equations (1) through (3). Table 2 summarises the results of equations (5) through (8), or how well the trust categories do compared to a relevant index.
It is best to discuss the results by grouping certain equations together. Equations (1) and (6) demonstrate the persistence of performance relative to an average for the trust category and an index, respectively. The relationship between variance and serial correlation can be assessed by the results for equations (3) and (8), while (2) and (7) show the effect of egregiousness . The findings are mixed. It is possible to discern a pattern suggestive of positive persistence and egregious fund performance, but only partially so.
From equation (1), 6 of the 16 βs are significantly positive and 2 significantly negative. So there is some evidence that good performance persists, qualified by the finding that half the regressions fail to reject the null hypothesis: past performance, relative to the average of a trust category, is no guide to future performance. Equation (6) shows a predominance of mean reversion because in half the regressions, β j is significantly negative. However, the results from equation (1) should be given the greater weight because there are 16 regressions, compared to 6 for equation (6). Also, (1), unlike (6), is testing for persistence of performance against the pack, not an index. Equations (3) and (8) have variance in relative returns as the dependent variable, making it possible to look at the effect of previous performance on variance. In equation (3), β is significantly negative for 6 of the 16 regressions, 3 are significantly positive and just under half are not significant. All but one of the βs in equation (8) is significantly negative. Overall, there is stronger evidence of a negative effect, that is, last year's bad performers take more risks in the current year. In equation (3), just under half of the γs are positive; 4 out of 6 are significantly positive in (8). Though γ is insignificant for 7 of the 16 regressions, the sign is significantly positive for all the UK general fund regressions, with many more funds than those in other categories.
Thus, on balance, risk taking persisted and funds that played safe continued to do so.
The dependent variable in equations (2) and (7) is performance, permitting a test of past variance on future performance, that is, whether or not the outliers do better.
The signs on β show only slight evidence of serial correlation; only 2 of the 16 βs are significantly negative, though 3 of 6 regressions of equation (7) have a significantly negative β, including the largest category including the largest of the fund groups, UK General. γ is significantly positive for 4 of the 16 regressions of equation (2) and 2 out of 6 for equation (7) A large number of the γs is insignificant. Thus, only a slight balance of evidence points towards a positive sign, meaning that, compared to average performers, bad (and good) performers this year tend to do better the next.
However, the largest of the fund groups, UK general, shows an unambiguously and significantly positive effect. Equation (5) was estimated to assess the degree of correlation between the choice of index and the relevant trust category. There were no indices for the trust categories Asia Pacific and Other Small firms, so they were excluded from the regressions of equations (5) through (9). Regressions of (5) result in a significantly positive index coefficient for all 6 groups, confirming a high degree of correlation between the performance of a given fund group and the relevant index. However, for Europe the coefficient is small, .132 , and for Global, it is actually negatively signed, if only weakly significant. These results are indicative of a high degree of heterogeneity in the contents of the European and Global trusts, and/or an inappropriate index. Tables 1 and 2 establish some evidence for persistence and egregiousness, using both benchmarks. Informed individuals (especially institutional investors, the main buyers of UK investment trusts) should be able to make quality judgements about funds. Therefore, one would expect to find, in a highly informed market, that fees are positively related to performance. As will be seen below, this is not the case. Table 3 shows the relationship between fees and performance. Just 14 of 240 regressions show any relationship between different measures of fees and gross annual returns on the fund. This finding supports the null hypothesis. The table only reports those regressions where the β coefficient was found to be significant.
With reference to table 3, when the dependent variable is the SUM of fees, β is negative and statistically significant for 5 regressions. When the fees are separated into annual, (initial fee/5), and (bid-offer spread/5), seven regressions show significantly negative β coefficients; but in two of them, β j >0 at the 5% level of confidence. Thus, in these cases, a higher fee (measured in different ways) is, if anything, weakly associated with worse past, current, and subsequent performance. Positive, significant, and very large αs, were found in all 240 regressions, suggestive of the high level of fees charged. Overall, as general rule, fees charged are effectively independent of past (t-1), present (t), and future (t+1) fund performance, no matter how fees are measured. There is no evidence that better performers raise fees in the following year, nor that higher fees are associated improved present or future performance.
The textbook ideal of an efficient market, peopled by informed agents and homogeneous firms, would imply a high degree of similarity in fees charged, no serial correlation in performance, and no association between fees and return, with differences in return purely random. If fund managers were known to differ in quality in such a market, investors would "get what they paid for": fees and returns would be positively correlated. The data sets under scrutiny reveal non-trivial differences in fees charged, together with overwhelming evidence against any positive link between fees and performance. Yet (as results from tables 1 and 2 verify), there is some unmistakable evidence of fund level persistence in both relative performance and variance. The inferences to be drawn are that at least some consumers are not perfectly informed (otherwise poor value funds could hardly survive) and that strict market efficiency is not confirmed, either. Table 4 reports the key results from the estimations of equation (9). Recall the nullthe relative performance of funds is not significantly different from the default firm, chosen because its performance was the closest to the average return in each of the fund categories. Again, Asian Pacific and "Other Small Companies" were excluded in the absence of an appropriate index. The coefficient on the relevant index is, as expected, very similar to estimates of β in equation (5) and similar remarks apply. Given the criteria for selecting the defaults, the pattern of significantly non-zero dummy coefficients points to the degree of symmetry or asymmetry in the distribution. For example, in UK General, no fewer than 48 firm dummies are negative, with some degree of significance. None is significantly positive. This finding suggests a distribution with a pronounced negative skew across individual funds, meaning there are some bad gambles for investors. On the other hand, for Japan, the absence of any significant non-zero dummy coefficients points to a distribution which is both symmetric and undispersed. For Japan, it scarcely matters which trust an investor chooses. Blake and Timmermann (1998) and others have warned of the dangers of survivor bias which will arise if "dead" funds are excluded from the sample, defined as the difference between the mean return on surviving funds and the mean on the full set of funds over the estimating period. Blake and Timmermann estimate the average of survivor bias at 0.8% per annum in their UK sample of unit trusts (open-ended mutual funds).
Given the objectives of this study, the analysis required working with n X t panel, and a necessary condition is a complete matrix, which would not have been possible if the full dataset had been used. To optimise the inferences available from the data, they had to be censored, cutting out 58 investment trusts 7
. Their exclusion would not have a bearing on the key coefficients of interest here, though the picture of surviving funds in relative terms might have been different. Blake and Timmermann's finding of a 0.8% per annum bias may help to explain the large positive αs found in the estimated equations (5), and (6) to (9). If the non-survivors were included, the size of the α coefficients would fall.
Conclusions
This article looked at the performance of 288 UK investment trusts in the period 1994-99. Drawing from an agency theoretic framework, the first three hypotheses test the performance of a fund relative to the average annual returns of the trust category, which differs from the approach adopted in published work. This study also looks at performance relative to an appropriate index, but unlike other work, goes one step further to test for fund specific effects. The same dataset contained information on fees, which allowed for direct tests of the relationship between fees and performance.
Beginning with fees, the null hypothesis is accepted: there is no relationship between fees, measured in different ways, and performance. In the rare case where a relationship was found to be significant, the results showed that fees and annual rates of return were negatively related.
The tests on relative performance showed some evidence of positive serial correlation, suggesting good fund performance in one year is associated with good returns the next. The effects of past variance on current performance and past performance on current variance were also tested. The results were not clear-cut, but the weight of evidence pointed to fund level persistence in both relative performance and variance. Also, there was evidence suggestive of boldness or a preponderance of persistence in risk taking. The three step utility function would predict that, in the following year, worse performers would tend to display greater variance and outliers display better performance than the average. A slender majority of evidence from this study is consistent with these predictions.
Finally, there was some evidence of significant fund specific behaviour in the largest of the investment trusts, UK General, indicating the presence of bad gambles for nearly half of the firms in this trust category, and an asymmetric distribution.
